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In any  encounter with theoretical texts there seems  to operate a set of 
rules,  stipulated  in the  performance  of reading,  that point  toward  a 
configuration  able  to  account for  a  certain number  of textual details: 
teleology.  This can be discovered in radical forms of deconstruction as 
much  as  in  traditional philosophical inquiry. In its  simplest form telos 
may appear as the deductive mechanism of subsumptive reason purveying 
a system  of closure.  Teleology  in this  sense  has been under  attack in 
recent literary theory. Rarely does this kind of attack address the notion 
of teleology  in  the  more  sophisticated version  in  which  it  appears in 
Kant's  Critique  of Judgment  (1968:  Section  61),  where  he  applies the 
distinction between determining and reflective reason: 
If  we  were  to  ascribe  to  nature  intentionally  effective  causes,  we  would  give 
teleology  as  a foundation not only a regulatory principle for the mere judgment 
of appearances,  according to which nature can be  thought to be following its 
specific laws,  but also a constitutive principle for the deduction of its products 
from their causes:  thus the concept of a purpose of nature would no longer be 
part of the reflective but of determining faculty of judgment. 
If  we align this with Kant's insistence on the merely heuristic character 
of all concepts,  according to which 'the concept therefore never stands 
between secure boundaries' and 'the completeness of the analysis of my 
concept is always in doubt' (Kant 1956: A728/B756), teleology becomes 
a much more exciting affair. 
In  a rich  survey of recent literary theory offered by Marcel Comis-
Pope under the title Hermeneutic Desire and Critical Rewriting: Narrative 
!nterpretation in the Wake of  Poststructuralism, the frame of  the discussion 
18  marked by two boundaries: the search for a secret in  the text and a 
sociocultural form of critical rewriting. Comis-Pope's study is instructive 
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in its encyclopedic assembly  of a large number of  theoretical positio 
as well as in its attempt to assemble these theories, roughly at least  alo ns 
the heuristic trajectory of a movement from a hermeneutics of ;elos ~g 
the  narrow sense  toward  a  reading/rewriting  practice  outside  the  te 
1
~ 
in the politics of culture. The author addresses issues close to the hea\ 
of literary  theory  and  criticism,  such  as  narratology,  deconstructio~ 
feminist literary theory, and critical rewriting. At the same time broade; 
questions are broached, as for example the problematic relation ofliterary 
theory and its critical practices to hermeneutics, phenomenology, and a 
semiotics beyond the linguistic. It is  here that Cornis-Pope touches  on 
the precarious intimacy that exists between specific disciplines on the one 
hand  and their  philosophical  backgrounds  on the  other,  and  on  the 
difficulties we encounter when we merge the two in the same discourse. 
Sociocultural criticism: Critical rewriting 
What  is  it  that  Cornis-Pope  wishes  the  reader  to  gather  under  this 
heading? The answer is given in a series of  hints and descriptions through-
out the book, as well as by way of a focused summary of critical readings 
of James's 'The figure  in the carpet' toward the end of his  study.  His 
theory of sociocultural, politically oriented and critical rewriting emerges 
from  the  discussion  of a  broad range  of contemporary literature.  As 
Cornis-Pope sees  it,  'critical reading in many of these models' not only 
produces its own objects, but also displaces alternative methods of inter-
pretation, 'its revisionistic impact' not being restricted 'to the world of 
texts' but being at the same time directed at 'the institutions of interpreta-
tion as  well'  (p.  4).  As  such the new  reading practice  has  drastically 
altered 'the terms that define the transaction between author and reader, 
textual figures  and critical response' by substituting 'a broadened focus 
on the discourse-producing interspace of reading' for a 'narrowly inter-
pretive paradigm' (p. 5). Nor does this new methodology rely on a single 
discipline.  To  do its  'revisionistic'  work it needs  to be  'endorsed from 
varied theoretical perspectives (reader-oriented, deconstructive, feminist, 
psychoanalytic, semiotic)' (p. 6), and so the new perspective encourages 
'a rewriting of literary texts from alternative points of view' (p. 11 ). 
Critical rewriting challenges referential-mimetic as  well  as  expressive 
models  of interpretation  and their  'search for  objective  or  subjective 
signifieds' (p. 9), and yet at the same time is argued to be able to refocus 
interpretation 'from the question of what makes literature literary, to the 
sociocultural  apparatus  that  takes  charge  of  literature,  organizes, 
translates  and  refracts  it'  (p. 11).  Following  Lefevere's  terminology, Hermeneutics in  critical rewriting  71 
Cornis-Pope tells us that rewriting as  'refraction is a powerful means of 
cultural dissemination and transformation, infusing an element of dyna-
mism  in  our traditional  definitions  of literature'  (p. 11).  The  political 
import of this  reorientation is  shown to  result in a  shift from  'formal 
poetics  and  an  immanent  analysis  of narrative  articulations,  to  an 
evaluation of the sociocultural investments that inform the production 
and reception of narratives' (p. 12). 
The program that thus emerges  is  'a literary pedagogy premised on 
the  concept  of rewriting'  which  addresses  both the  mechanisms  that 
inform interpretive paradigms and the tools that 'enable readers to per-
form them problematically, with a critical awareness of their underlying 
agendas and grammars of  moves' (p. 15). Cornis-Pope gives three reasons 
for this new focus:  ( 1) Re-reading by itself does not necessarily result in 
'a  high  critical  performance'  (p. 25);  (2)  'Critical  awareness  and self-
knowledge' depend on readers being self-reflexively engaged in an activity 
of critical restructuring (rewriting)' (p. 26); and (3) the conviction that 
'a critical practice emphasizing rewriting' is in itself a political act (p. 27). 
How rewriting constitutes a politics is not altogether obvious, although 
at the end of the book the reader has a much better idea what the political 
amounts  to.  Yet  without  an  actual  politics  in  the  broad sense  of an 
agenda concerning matters of state and social goals at large, any specific 
politics  of reading lacks  orientation.  And without orientation, there is 
no politics. That is  why it is surprising that Cornis-Pope does not draw 
on works which have paid special attention to questions of the politics 
of reading and questions of ideological effects of  discourse. In this respect 
I  note  the  absence  of Pecheux  (1986)  and  Frow  (1986).  Or,  if the 
emphasis of a politics of interpretation is  on the institutions of reading, 
a more serious attempt at reference to Foucault's work would have been 
helpful.  In particular, the critical tool kit supplied in The Archeology of 
Knowledge  (1978), with its discussion of the 'enunciative function'  and 
its  consequences,  is  a gold mine for the kind of task that Cornis-Pope 
has set himself.  In addressing such aspects of discourse as the 'surface of 
emergence' of specific 'discursive formations', their 'grids of  specification', 
and  their  'authorities of delimitation',  as  well  as  the  question of who 
speaks, who is entitled to fill  the 'vacant subject position', and what sort 
of discursive formations are employed, Foucault provides a rich starting 
point for  a critical rewriting.  Perhaps the most important emphasis  as 
far  as  Cornis-Pope's  project of an interpretive politics is  concerned is 
~oucault's rejection of the idealization of language into an isolable scien-
tific item. Instead, he broadens the traditional language-theoretical focus 
~
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said. The result is a notion of 'statement' which includes of necessity the 
broad  political  frame  which  we  can  construe  for  any  language  use. 
Likewise, the kind of post-structuralist practice that Cornis-Pope wishes 
to be political requires an 'exteriority' of the Foucauldian kind. Without 
this sort of backup, attempts at making literary criticism look political 
a difficult proposition under any circumstances, remain somewhat shaky: 
And  yet  Cornis-Pope  is  by  no  means  naive  when  it  comes  to  the 
relationship  between  critical  practice  and other bodies  of knowledge. 
'Critical choices', he observes, 'are connected to a theory of language, a 
philosophy of representation, a politics of interpretation' (p. 28). In the 
end, it may come down to a question of what in the United States tends 
to be regarded as political in comparison with the cultural expectations 
of European writers on the subject. As it turns out in the end, there is 
very  little  politics  in  the  readings  of James's  story,  with  the  notable 
exception of the discussion  of one of the  graduate student essays,  the 
only feminist reading and also, perhaps not surprisingly, the only reading 
with a strong politics of  interpretation. Ann Elsworth's analysis of, among 
other things, the phallocentric representations in 'The figure in the carpet' 
transcends a reading of Henry James and potentially also the practice of 
literary criticism by pointing to  the ideological effects of such figures  in 
all discourse. 
It  does not come as a surprise, then, that it is Cornis-Pope's discussion 
of feminist literary theory which provides the sort of political ingredient 
promised  but  not  quite  fulfilled  in  his  critical  rewriting  practice. 
Commenting on the recent work of Barbara Johnson, Cornis-Pope notes 
that 'her essays have now overt political and pedagogical implications' 
(p. 119), though what he means by political is still restricted to classroom 
practice.  'Like response theory and deconstruction', he  writes,  'feminist 
criticism has pursued a reader-oriented, revisionistic interpretive practice, 
as  well  as  a rigorous critique of the ideological infrastructures of inter-
pretation' (p. 121 ).  Perhaps one could qualify this by adding that reader 
orientation has no  doubt left its  mark on feminist  literary theories,  as 
has  deconstruction  and,  more  importantly,  the  Lacanian  revision  of 
Freud, but there seems  to be  a crucial difference that is  undermined in 
the  discussion.  There  is  no  political  agenda  to  speak  of for  reader-
response theory outside the classroom. Feminist literary theory, by con-
trast, draws powerfully on the political discourse of feminism at large. 
Having said this, the reader acknowledges the very useful overview of 
a broad range of feminist positions and the critical debate within feminist 
literature as to where feminist theory should be heading. Judith Fetterley 
(1981) is  shown to advocate the transition from searching for meaning 
to  controlling  meaning,  from  hermeneutics  to  power  (p. 122),  while t 
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Elaine Showalter's 'Feminist criticism in the wilderness'  (1985:  246f.) is 
noted for referring to the '"feminist obsession with correcting ...  male 
critical theory" ', a stance which ' "keeps us dependent upon it and retards 
our progress in solving our own theoretical problems'" (p. 122). Cornis-
Pope also observes a shift from the critique of the patriarchal canon and 
theory toward the shaping of a theory able to account for 'questions of 
feminine  specificity'  (pp. 123f.).  In  this  he  quotes  in  detail  Paula 
Treichler's summary analysis of eight major positions: ( 1) sex and gender; 
(2)  the  binarization  of biological  complexities  into  two  genders;  (3) 
feminism  and class struggle;  (  4) female difference and the construction 
as the Other; ( 5) the female body and the politics of social construction; 
(6)  the inscription of female  subjectivity in  language;  (7) the rewriting 
of history from the perspective of women; and (8) the ontic and epistemic 
foundations of these approaches (pp. 125f.). 
One  of the  tasks  for  feminism  is  seen  to  be  the  countering  of the 
tradition of women as 'self-effacing semiotic objects' (p. 132) visible only 
as  'reductive  signs'  under the  'domination of the  male  gaze'  (p. 133). 
With  reference  to  the  work of Laura Mulvey,  Cornis-Pope lists  three 
possible  consequences  of working  within  the  frame  of the  'gaze':  (1) 
collusion (i.e., taking part in male gaze control as  objects of desire); (2) 
feigning the stance of the male gaze; and (3) resistance to both (p. 133). 
A third task for  feminist  writers is  to address the problem of mastery 
through  language.  Here  he  quotes  Barthes:  ' "The master  is  he  who 
speaks, who has all of the language at his disposal; the object is he who 
remains  silent"'  (1971:  36).  On this  topic  the  work  of Jean-Franyois 
Lyotard  on  the  'differend'  would  be  helpful.  Lyotard's  theory  of the 
conflictual nature of language as discourse could be used to shore up the 
claim of competing demands on the reader made by the differential nature 
of literary tropes. 
Following Donna Przybylowicz (1986:  18), Cornis-Pope suggests that 
the later work of Henry James, his 'autoanalytic narratives', contains a 
critique of nineteenth-century fiction.  This seems a good observation in 
the sense  that self-reflexive writing tends to be strongly intertextual and 
so  is  aware of relations between itself and its precursor texts.  However, 
we  should also register that the specific points of scrutiny discoverable 
!n James are only visible given the angles which a certain literary theory 
Ill this case, a feminist theoretical practice - has supplied. 
As  to  the work of Kristeva,  Cixous, and Irigaray, Cornis-Pope feels 
that its utopian tendencies could be improved by radicalizing its poetics 
With  the help of 'cultural and political analysis' (p. 132)  along the lines 
of Teresa de Lauretis's '"materialist, semiotic theory of  culture"' (p. 132) 
as  outlined in Alice Doesn't (de  Lauretis 1984:  15).  But Cornis-Pope is 74  H.  Ruthrof 
always  on  dangerous  ground  with  phrases  such  as  'These  rev1s10ns 
should ... A more fruitful approach would ... feminism can function ... 
' (p. 128) which would direct feminist theory in some way or other. On 
the other hand, he supports the success of feminist theory in highlighting 
two  related  phenomena:  the  phallocentric  nature  of represented  male 
experience in fiction and the subordination of women's experience in the 
form of an object position (p. 129). For example he appropriately quotes 
Marge Piercy ( 1973: 267): '"I only want to use words as weapons because 
I'm tired of being beaten with them"' (p. 130). 
Piercy,  as  many  other  feminists,  puts  her  finger  on  the  difference 
between actual politics and a pedagogy as political statement with mini-
mal reality effect.  The argument is  not that we  should no longer read 
Henry James;  rather, the point is  that we  should be cautious when we 
claim that we are now engaging in a specific political practice. After all, 
the test is the answer to the question: What sort of sociocultural politics 
has now been accomplished? 
Deconstruction 
One could not agree  more with Cornis-Pope when he writes  that 'the 
problems of deconstruction' are the consequence of 'a simplified applica-
tion  of Derrida's  radical  critique  of the  logocentric  tradition  to  the 
dynamics of reading', which turns reading into a mere 'rhetorical perusal 
of textual indeterminacies and dislocations' (p. 39). Instead, Cornis-Pope 
proposes a 'resocialised theory and practice of reading that would take 
its  critical  strategies  outside  the  "safe"  area  of literature,  to  other 
categories of cultural texts' (p. 39). 
The question suggests itself as  to what those other cultural texts are 
and whether they are able to retain their 'realist' status or are homoge-
nized in the classroom into yet more fictions.  Deconstruction here faces 
a dilemma: we  know the world only in terms of texts since  'there is  no 
outside-the-text'.  Nevertheless,  one does not have to turn empiricist to 
suggest that there are at least some texts that we sense have more reality 
force than others. Being shot or tortured is  a different sort of text than 
activating indeterminacies in 'The figure in the carpet'. Note that I have 
not abandoned the textualist stance in  this criticism.  What I suggest is 
that  we  need  more  than  language-oriented  theories  to  interpret  this 
problematic. 
As it is designed, the critical practice of rewriting draws on 'sociosemi-
otics'  and a 'recontextualised Derridean deconstruction' which chooses 
as  its target 'the sociocultural and institutional infrastructures of inter-Hermeneutics in  critical rewriting  75 
pretation'  (pp. 39f.).  As  such,  critical  rewriting  would  'demystify  the 
mechanisms of figural and hermeneutic desire', and so offer a methodical 
appraisal of the conventions and discursive strategies underlying 'textual 
practice'  (p. 40).  Cornis-Pope  sees  a  number  of advantages  in  this 
approach: ( 1) freedom from pressures of 'hermeneutic desire and textual 
consumption' for  'more active modes of critical analysis and construc-
tion'; (2) correction of one's own 'reading habits and assumptions'; and 
(3) foregrounding of hidden naturalizations which affect  our meaning-
making processes and the way we construct the world. 
Reading and writing are now interchangeable not only in the Derridean 
sense  of reading being a kind of writing, but also in the practical sense 
of reading being already performed from a perspective of rewriting: the 
two  are 'inseparable' (p. 40). Given the strong sympathies for Derrida's 
work expressed in his early comments on deconstruction, it comes as a 
bit of a surprise that in the remainder of the book Cornis-Pope does not 
in  some  way  avail  himself of the technical instruments which Derrida 
has  introduced to  interpretation.  Instead,  Cornis-Pope takes  his  main 
cues from the more literary-rhetorical form of deconstruction developed 
by Paul de Man. 
Deconstruction, as  Cornis-Pope sums it up, makes 'unreadability the 
focus  of its painstakingly minute rhetorical analysis';  it 'continues and 
subverts  a  formalist  "close  reading",  that  derives  meaning  from  the 
structural properties of a text' (p. 83)  and mediates between subjective 
response  criticism and semiology with its  'interpretive conventions and 
grammatical codes'. Deconstruction is  presented as  a 'mode of radical, 
polemical reading' whose role it is  to 'uncover the rhetorical forces of a 
text, its problematic figural mastery'. In so  doing deconstruction is able 
'to  expose,  by  re-enacting  it in its  own  discourse,  the  text's  effort  to 
transcend difference  and set  snug boundaries around meaning' (p. 84). 
Cornis-Pope  cites  de  Man's formulation  of the  supplementarity of all 
texts, including those of our own readings ( 1979:  205). '"The paradigm 
of all texts consists of a figure (or a system of figures) and its deconstruc-
tion.  But  since  this  model  cannot be  closed  off by  a final  reading,  it 
engenders, in its turn, a supplementary figural superposition which nar-
rates the unreadability of the prior narration"' (p. 83). We  are dealing 
here  with a kind of Godel procedure in literary theory whereby  every 
system always contains propositions which cannot be explained in terms 
of its rules.  So we have to move to a metalevel of explanation, a system 
which  is  bound by the same law as  the previous one and so  on for at 
least a very long time.  Derrida specifically defers to Godel on this point 
(1981: 219). Perhaps one could even say by way of rough shorthand that 76  H.  Ruthrof 
Derrida has performed for philosophy what Godel had earlier done for 
formal logic. 
As a result of Derrida's critique of the  'metaphysical investments' on 
which rest the 'hierarchical separations between text and reader, reading 
and writing, literature and non-literature', the traditional differentiation 
between what is  literature and what is  literary criticism has turned into 
'a responsive  membrane'  permitting  'textual resonances  to  carry both 
ways'. Thus literary criticism, in its deconstructive versions, has become 
'an endless retracing of textual figures  from alternative viewpoints,  an 
activation of the text's own differential potential' (p. 86). With reference 
to Hillis  Miller's reading of James's 'The figure  in  the carpet', Cornis-
Pope observes that now 'a logic of differentiation and supplementarity, 
rather than one of identity, sustains these chains of figural substitutions' 
(p. 87). What Cornis-Pope perhaps should not say is that 'deconstruction 
has turned for inspiration to a radical hermeneutics like that of Jacques 
Derrida' (p. 84). It is  reassuring that hermeneutics is  allowed to live  on 
in the guise of deconstruction, but what sort of deconstruction was this 
that was able to turn to Derrida? Hartman's, Miller's, de Man's? Before 
Derrida's translation of Heidegger's term Destruktion as  deconstruction 
there was neither such a term nor any identifiable mode of writing known 
as deconstruction (Derrida 1982:  118). Barring the possibility of 'origin', 
Derrida's writing established the very signifier by means of which later 
deconstructive criticism was to flourish. De Man himself sees this (1983: 
111) when he  says that ' "Derrida'  s work is one of the places where the 
future  possibility of literary criticism is  decided"', including de  Man's 
own (p. 85). There is  also of course the fundamental difference between 
Derrida's enterprise  as  a  primarily philosophical critique  and its  later 
applications in a variety of disciplines,  of which literary theory was  no 
doubt the most adventurous first. 
It is  from this perspective that we  should also see  the work of Hillis 
Miller, whose reading of James's story reflects the 'paradoxical logic' of 
deconstruction by following 'two alternative paths' at the same time -
one  which  'retraces  the  text's  process  of  self-interpretation  (self-
deconstruction)', while 'the other subverts more radically the text's (and 
its  own) effort at figural mastery' (p. 88). With reference to a paper by 
William  Cain,  Cornis-Pope rightly  stresses  about Miller's  reading  the 
unacknowledged  'role  that  critical  control  plays  in  deconstruction' 
(p. 89), which brings out the heterologic movement of the text's rhet-
oric - but only in the hands of a critic with a deconstructive plan to do 
so, I would add. Cornis-Pope is also pretty accurate in describing Miller's 
practice as 'an activity of refiguration' in a 'restrained concept of decon-
structive reading' (p. 91 ). More than previous critical traditions, decon-If 
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struction is  argued to exploit the fact that 'narrative texts are unable to 
contain  their  semiosis,  deferring  the  problem of interpretation to  the 
reader'  (p. 91 ).  But Cornis-Pope suggests further that 'Miller's critical 
narrative does more than just thematise undecidability in the form of an 
allegorical plot that replaces the linear, referential teleology of a classic 
text  with  a  deconstructive  teleology'.  By  focusing  on  the  'theme  of 
logocentric  seduction'  he  achieves  both a  'critical  articulation'  and its 
'provisional, unfulfilled status'. Now unreadability is readable as a result 
of 'textual re-enactment that induces in us a desire for the possession of 
the  logos,  only to frustrate it "in a torsion  of undecidability which is 
intrinsic in language"'. Where Cornis-Pope parts company with Miller is 
on 'the larger sociocultural questions that such a re-reading of tradition 
can  implicate'  (p. 93),  which  Hillis  Miller,  unlike  Derrida,  does  not 
pursue. 
The kind of  critical reading Cornis-Pope absorbs into his own rewriting 
practice is de Man's 'strong, performative response to the figural nature 
of texts,  conveying an illusion of totality through its  own tropological 
procedures,  but "arguing" against that illusion  as  it uncovers  the gap 
between figure  and meaning, linguistic articulations and their rhetorical 
effects  in the text it interprets'. At the heart of a theory of reading, for 
Cornis-Pope as  for  de  Man, lies  '"a theory of tropes"' (1986:  45), of 
'rhetorical manoeuvres that posit and displace meaning' (p. 95) such as 
catachresis, prosopopoeia, apostrophe rather than those 'unifying figures 
of metaphor and symbol' (p. 96). 
Cornis-Pope  draws  our  attention  to  de  Man's  rhetorical-linguistic 
method, which borrows 'certain concerns from other modes of reading, 
particularly  phenomenological',  yet  'distributes  the  accents  very 
differently,  emphasising the time-bound,  error-prone dynamic of inter-
pretation' (p. 102). As with all strongly relativist positions, the notion of 
'error' is  problematic in deconstruction; it suggests that we  have some-
thing  against  which  to  say  that  something  else  is  an error.  No such 
security of judgment is  afforded the reader in deconstruction as Derrida 
has  launched it.  Likewise,  the notion of 'completeness' sits  oddly with 
deconstructive  theorizing.  And  yet  de  Man  (1983:  32)  suggests  that 
'critical  "understanding can be  called complete  only  when it becomes 
aware  of its  own  temporal predicament and realizes  that the horizon 
Within which the totalisation can take place is time itself"' (p. 102). The 
idea  of a  'complete'  understanding  as  well  as  the  very  possibility  of 
totalization even within the open frame of time is far removed from the 
Derridean view of things. 
Of course Cornis-Pope speaks of de Man rather than Derrida, but he 
also speaks of deconstruction. He describes well how deconstruction has 78  H.  Ruthrof 
been transformed in the United States from its much more philosophical 
European version.  'Introduced in North America by excellent rhetorical 
readers  such  as  Paul  de  Man,  J.  Hillis  Miller  or  Geoffrey  Hartman' 
(p. 103),  'Derridean  deconstruction  was  successfully  rehashed  into  a 
mode  of close  reading',  (p. 104).  This  is  a  fair  and  important point 
underlined  by  Cornis-Pope's  reference  to  Barbara  Johnson's  critiqu~ 
(1987:  14) about a situation for which the reasons are buried deep in the 
very different intellectual makeup of Europe and the United States. 
Yet Cornis-Pope's preference for de Man's version of deconstruction 
is not altogether in his own interest. This becomes evident when we note 
the absence especially of Derrida's infrastructural tools: difft!rance, meta-
phoricity,  trace,  supplementarity,  margin,  hymen,  pharmakon,  and 
others.  And yet it is  in Derrida's writing rather than in  de  Man's that 
Cornis-Pope discovers ingredients for a socioculturally committed politics 
of reading  able  to  offer  'an examination of a  culture's master  tropes' 
(p. 109).  As  he cites Derrida (1988:  648,  640),  'deconstruction is  "des-
tined  . . .  to  the  analysis  of the  conditions  of totalitarianism in  all  its 
forms  ... [such as]  continuism, analogism, telelogism, hasty totalization, 
reduction,  and  derivation"'  (p. 112).  A  little  later  Derrida  is  quoted 
again on the politics of deconstruction. Deconstruction, writes Derrida 
(1980;  quoted in Leitch 1986:  47), "'is also, at the very least, a way of 
taking a position, in the work of analysis,  concerning the political and 
institutional  structures  that make  possible  and govern  our practice"' 
(p. 113).  And much later in the book we  find  this  useful  reference to 
Said (1983: 5), who insists that' "the realities of power and authority-
as well  as  the resistance offered by men, women and social movements 
to institutions, authorities and orthodoxies - are the realities that make 
texts possible, that deliver them to their readers, that solicit the attention 
of critics"' (p. 186). 
If we compare this with Cornis-Pope's description of his own politics, 
we  note a  marked narrowing  of scope.  He  distinguishes  three  trends: 
'textual semiosis'  (response  to textual signs);  'narrative reconstruction' 
('naturalisation, reframing, fiction-making');  and a  'politics  of reading' 
(negotiations  between  'gendered,  socially-positioned  "meaners"'  -
p. 176).  As  it  turns  out,  Cornis-Pope's  critical  pedagogy  in  the  end 
produces only the mildest form of such a politics. 
Throughout  the  book  and  its  rich  array  of quotations  there  is  a 
Relevanzangst, an anxiety that interpretive practices are too hedonistic, 
merely playful,  rather than sociopolitically engaged. It is  not that this 
fear is unjustified, but rather than it comes with expensively trained minds 
having  chosen  professions  the  social  benefits  of which  are  not  easily 
demonstrated in a commercial climate characterized by the sales pitch of 
c 
c 
( 
a 
0 
i~ 
d Hermeneutics in  critical rewriting  79 
secondhand car dealers and the accountability demands of managerial 
quality controls. What are strong, bright minds like yours doing in as 
unproductive  a  business  as  literary criticism?  Well?  Perhaps the  short 
answer is that a society is  as smart as it is  self-reflexive. In this, socially 
oriented theorizing is certainly a conditio sine qua non.  But perhaps the 
fear  of critical uselessness  has to do also with a  very North American 
phenomenon, the marginalization of speculative philosophy and ideologi-
cal  critique in the public sphere. And if we  consider what sociocultural 
criticism  actually amounts to in the end,  we  note that both choice  of 
literary text and critical apparatus are not well suited to make the claim 
stick.  'The artistic-aesthetic preoccupations of Henry James' is  not the 
easiest topic to render socially fertile, though no doubt this can be done. 
Much more seriously, the most powerful theories to quench the author's 
desire  for  social  impact  are  absent  or  sidelined.  And yet  Habermas, 
Lyotard, Pecheux, Frow, Jameson, Eagleton, Hodge and Kress, or Felski 
in  Beyond  Feminist  Aesthetics,  for  example,  offer  very  much  what 
Cornis-Pope appears to be looking for. 
Where  Hermeneutic  Desire  and Critical Rewriting is  impressive is  in 
the  detailed work that has gone into recording and editing examples of 
actual  critical practice.  Leaving  the half-fulfilled  promise  of a  politics 
aside,  a number of things that Cornis-Pope does are particularly attrac-
tive.  He speaks of an 'interpretive community', a notion that seems  to 
have its roots in Peirce's community-defined semiotics (CP 5.311 ), accord-
ing to which 'the very origin of the conception of reality shows that this 
conception essentially involves the notion of a COMMUNITY, without 
definite limits, and capable of a definite increase in knowledge'. Likewise, 
Cornis-Pope's interpretive community can be understood as going beyond 
the classroom, a historically dynamic sphere that sanctions signification 
and in so doing alters the community's constitution. 
Another point worth pursuing is Cornis-Pope's detailed reading ladder, 
on which the interpretive community occupies the last rung. He distingu-
ishes  seven  steps:  ( 1) Reading:  vulnerable to the  'plot of hermeneutic 
desire'; (2) Narrative Comprehension: realization of'the process by which 
an  enigma  is  constructed';  (3)  Critical  Response:  being  attracted  to 
specific figurations such as the limited narrator, or ideological limitations 
of the story; ( 4) Interactional Plot: breaking the narratorial contract by 
reformulating its rules; (5) Refiguration: from the narrator's puzzlement 
by  the figure to a number of alternative themes; ( 6) Rewriting: placing 
the  author's language into the intersubjective  context of the classroom; 
and (7) The Function of the Interpretive Community: to create a 'sense 
of generic  and rhetorical  complementarity'  between  text  and reading 
(pp, 223-231). 80  H.  Ruthrof 
The book closes with two useful chapters, a demonstration of student 
readings and Cornis-Pope's own from a number of  perspectives: a critique 
of archetypical  reading,  a  deconstructive  reading,  a  game-theoretical 
approach, a feminist challenge to stipulated male reading positions, etc. 
and a  concluding section  on a  post-structuralist literary pedagogy.  In 
Cornis-Pope's own deconstructive reading we find an almost New Critical 
interpretation, which he calls 'rhetorical-deconstructive', of  the 'narrator's 
varied activities in the story' (p. 245) in eight steps:  (a) narratorial pres-
ence; (b) narrator's limitations; (c) narratorial self-reflexivity; (d) chang-
ing status of narrator;  (e)  the making of figural  secrecy;  (f) narrator's 
gradual understanding  of the  'subversive  dynamics  of figuration';  (g) 
figure and desire; and (h) figure and game motif (p. 246). Now we know 
what the  sociocultural  message  is:  'the pluralistic ideology  of writing/ 
reading',  a well-informed,  flexible  and liberated rhetorical creativity in 
the community of the classroom  a modest political result. 
Hermeneutics 
In spite  of its  antipositivist  heritage,  there  is  without doubt a  strong 
conservative streak in  philosophical hermeneutics.  But if we  equate its 
conservatism with positivist convictions themselves we have lost the plot, 
even if this plot as  a historical figuration is  itself the dynamic result of 
hermeneutic negotiation. One of the achievements of Heidegger's herme-
neutic, for example, is  to show that far from logical assertion being an 
independent and pure chain of reasoning, it is part of the larger horizon 
of understanding  and  its  reflexive  form,  interpretation.  Apophantic 
reason, as Heidegger calls it, or the formal text are shown to be a special 
case of hermeneutic circularity in which logical viciousness turns into the 
gradual clarification of our world.  Leaving Schleiermacher and Dilthey 
aside, apart from noting that they cannot be eliminated from a chain of 
writing opposed to positivist certainty and in which Heidegger is a crucial 
link, hermeneutics belongs to a tradition which sees  cognition as  inter-
pretive work rather than as  the recovery of an item buried in the past. 
In this, hermeneutics since Heidegger draws on phenomenological prin-
ciples  of the  homologous  and  yet  always  different  relations  between 
horizon and theme which both author and interpreter cannot help  but  i 
employ.  The inevitability  of the  hermeneutic circle  - or hermeneutic 
helix, to improve on the metaphor - in all signification is a consequence 
of the bare bones  of the  theory we  can glean from Heidegger's work 
(1962:  188-214). It is  here also  that Heidegger refines  Schleiermacher's 
distinction  between  subtilitas  intelligendi  and  subtilitas  explicandi,  to '{ 
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which Cornis-Pope refers early in the book (p. 7), by demonstrating how 
interpretation and understanding are intertwined. 
Gadamer's  considerable  contribution to  hermeneutics  receives  short 
shrift in  Cornis-Pope's account. But since hermeneutics is  treated more 
as a whipping boy than a serious object of description this is not surpris-
ing. The closest Cornis-Pope gets to doing justice to Gadamer is a brief 
quote on the active ingredient in understanding, which ' "is not merely a 
reproductive, but always a productive attitude as well" ', a new semiotic 
performance (p. 29). 
Jauss's hermeneutic is compatible to a point with the theoretical and 
critical discourse we find in Hermeneutic Desire and Critical Rewriting. 
In his recent work J  auss distinguishes three phases of reading. One traces 
'the  formation  of aesthetic  perception  in  actu. It can be  described  in 
terms of poetic structure and still-undefined expectations about the mean-
ing  of the text'.  In the second phase 'one circles back from the end of 
the  poem and the whole that has been established to the beginning' so 
that 'the aesthetic experience of the first reading can become the horizon 
of interpretive understanding, an understanding that elaborates a context 
of meaning  from  the  conjecture  and unanswered  questions  that were 
part of that experience'. Yet this second phase has left open 'which of its 
elements have been engendered by the text and which have been imposed 
by  the  interpreter'.  We  require  a  third kind  of reading  in which 'the 
analysis must delineate the earlier horizon in order to bring into play the 
temporal distance that was at first ignored'. Jauss adds yet a further step 
in which an authorial meaning is construed ('reconstructed') 'as a histori-
cal countervoice' in negotiation with 'the interpreter's own understanding 
[which]  must be  elucidated on the basis  of the  reception history  that 
defines his horizon of interpretation' (Jauss 1989: 231f.). 
Jauss's  hermeneutic  makes  for  an  instructive  comparison  with  the 
moves  proposed by Cornis-Pope, who likewise envisages three method-
ological steps: there is a .first reading which deals with immediate responses 
as well as 'hermeneutic' clues and impediments; a rereading which achieves 
a critical review  of phase one by identifying gaps  and indeterminacies; 
and  a  third  phase  which  rewrites  the  text  in  an  activity  of 'critical 
production' (pp. 202f.) Apart from the post-structuralist addition of criti-
cal  rewriting  the hermeneutic project which informs the Jauss  passage 
resurfaces  in  Cornis-Pope,  except  for  Jauss's  important  emphasis  on 
reception  history.  In other words,  a  near  'complete'  hermeneutics  has 
now  been embedded in  an alternative chain of interpretive reasoning. 
But this is not the impression one gains in reading either Cornis-Pope or 
a range of post-structuralist texts embarrassed at what they construe as 
the hermeneutic hunt for buried secrets. 82  H.  Ruthrof 
Cornis-Pope invokes  Henry James  in  pointing to  the futility  of the 
search for a 'remunerative secret, or latent intention' and 'explanations 
clues  and glimpses  [that]  won't hold',  (Notebooks:  138)  Once  Cornis~ 
Pope has  identified  this  secret as  'the hermeneutic plot outlined in  the 
Notebooks (several critics  grappling with a secret authorial intention)' 
(p. 3), hermeneutics has taken on the description of a 'quest for a single 
authorial meaning submerged between print and paper' (p. 3). But now 
hermeneutics has become unrecognizable.  This  is  no  more than a pop 
version of a concept too complex for rash usage. In fact a peculiar twist 
has occurred. What hermeneutics used to attack as positivist is now seen 
as hermeneutic to make room for a more emancipated practice. 
What Cornis-Pope appears to have in mind when  he  uses  the  term 
'hermeneutics' are the positions of such scholars as Fry and Hirsch, who 
defend  'a body of evidence  beyond controversy'  (Fry)  and  'principles 
that hold true all of the time in textual interpretation' (Hirsch) (p. 4  ). It 
is  this  sort  of utterance  which  allows  Cornis-Pope  to  juxtapose  'the 
hermeneutic desire for  single,  "emergent meanings" '  to  'self-conscious 
critical production' (p. 28)  and to distinguish Iser, whom he  later calls 
'a  frustrated  hermeneut  at  heart'  (p. 169)  and  his  'qualified  reader-
hermeneutics'  from  Hirsch,  the author of a  'prescriptive hermeneutics' 
(p. 52).  Cornis-Pope is  certainly right in criticizing E.D. Hirsch by sug-
gesting that 'the mighty submerged area of "unwilled" meaning returns 
to haunt Hirsch's intentionalist paradigm, creating a split between textual 
"meaning" and critical "significance"' (p. 14), and he is likewise persua-
sive in censoring Stanley Fish's approach for 'the hermeneutic circularity 
of its  conventionalist claims  [which exclusively  draw  our]  attention to 
the critic's own textual manoeuvres' (p. 14). 
Yet it is  only in this  kind  of context that we  should accept Cornis-
Pope's identification of  the 'hermeneutic of desire' as an approach marked 
by 'strong generic and hermeneutic expectations, with a desire to move 
quickly from indeterminate, open-ended signifiers to unambiguous signi-
fieds'.  And yet Cornis-Pope concedes that even in this simplified herme-
neutics matters are not that simple, for it is 'narratives themselves [that] 
seduce us [by] fostering in us a desire for closure', (p. 28). Now it seems 
that hermeneutics has been a victim of literature itself, whereas a more 
emancipatory reading practice would allow us to write a critical counter-
narrative.  This  leads  the  author  to  distinguish  between  two  kinds  of 
desires:  narrative  desire  in the  text and hermeneutic  desire  as  part of 
reading.  'Thus  both  texts  and  their  critical  readings  participate  in  a 
dialogic process that sets  narrative desire  (or  an endless  generation of 
figures  and events/changes)  against  hermeneutic desire  (for  figurative/ 
interpretive closure)' (p. 29).  And hermeneutic desire,  we  are told,  is  a 
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reading 'for latent hidden meanings' (p. 32). These two forms  of desire 
are  at the heart of Cornis-Pope's argument.  As  he  sums  up the point, 
'the  transgressive  interplay  of hermeneutic  desire  and  critical  recon-
struction in the interpretive process is  the unifying theme of my book', 
(p. 36). 
It would seem that Cornis-Pope has reduced hermeneutics to a narrow 
activity:  the  search for  a  hidden  signified.  It is  an act  of considerable 
theoretical violence to so  shrink the concept that it can no longer cope 
with anything but the simplest idea of a buried meaning. Neither Barthes's 
hermeneutic code, nor Jauss's methodological hermeneutic, nor the elabo-
rate  procedures  which  Gadamer  describes  as  hermeneutic,  let  alone 
Heidegger's  foundational  claims  for  the hermeneutic  circularity  of all 
interpretation are recognizable in this usage of the term. 
Another dubious  description  of hermeneutics  is  to  associate  it with 
'end-stopped'  readings.  Only hard-headed empiricists  who  conceive  of 
objects  as  given  in the  finality  of their  properties  and positivists who 
assume the possibility of a matching of world and language can stipulate 
'end-stopped' procedures. Cornis-Pope quite happily turns hermeneutics 
into this kind of theoretical stance. 'Poststructuralist and reader-oriented 
criticism  have  questioned the hermeneutic,  end-stopped mode of inter-
pretation,  recommending instead a  process  approach that promises  to 
convert an economy of hermeneutic desire into one of rewriting/remodel-
ing of texts' (p. 36). There are important differences between hermeneu-
tics  in  its Heideggerian and Gadamerian and Jaussian applications, on 
the  one  hand,  and post-structuralism as  well  as  reader-oriented theory 
on the other. Yet it is not that the former is 'end-stopped' while the latter 
are  continuous. Whatever the differences,  'end-stopped' criticism is  not 
so much hermeneutic as positivist. 
So what is  Cornis-Pope's hermeneutic? Through much of the book it 
acts as a scapegoat for conservative, naive, theoretically uninformed, and 
authoritarian reading habits conducive to an 'essentialist hermeneutics' 
(p. 50). However, we  also find a more neutral use of the term, allowing 
for  different  interpretive pursuits.  As  he  puts it at one  point,  'literary 
pedagogy  can  fruitfully  exploit  the  tension  between  different  modes/ 
phases  of reading,  moving  from  a  naturalised first  reading,  to a  self-
conscious secondary hermeneutics that will call for the "text's difference", 
its capacity to overstep its own articulatory system' (p. 23). Cornis-Pope 
even  discovers  the hermeneutic in deconstruction, which,  'as a reading 
strategy' concerned with the dismantling of 'traditional models and habits 
of interpretation', has  adopted as  'radical [a]  hermeneutics'  as  that of 
Jacques Derrida (p. 84 ). Later in the book Cornis-Pope once more speaks 
of a hermeneutic in deconstruction and its 'hermeneutic and instructional 84  H.  Ruthrof 
promise'  (p. 109)  Such equivocation is  welcome  since  it concedes  that 
there  is  nothing in  principle  in  the  hermeneutic  tradition  that would 
disallow  the  further  methodological  step  of rewriting.  Indeed,  earlier 
Cornis-Pope had made the hermeneutic concession that 'every theory of 
interpretation ... is still bound to a specific mode of seeing and articulat-
ing, to strong interpretive frameworks, mediating concepts, and strategies 
of emplotment'  (p. 15).  Unfortunately,  the  description  given  of tradi-
tional  hermeneutics  is  misleading  for  readers  unable  to  balance  their 
judgment by way of a more sophisticated version of the tradition from 
Schleiermacher to Jauss. 
Phenomenology 
In spite of a sympathetic attitude to some features of phenomenology, 
Cornis-Pope also perpetuates a number of fairly  widespread misunder-
standings concerning its procedures and in particular the pioneering work 
of Roman Ingarden. When he  speaks of 'the later theories  of semantic 
indeterminacy'  (p. 44)  he  fails  to  mention  Ingarden's  elaboration  of 
Husserl's  notion  of 'appresentation'  in  terms  of 'concretization'  and 
'lacunae of indeterminacy'.  In The  Literary  Work of Art (1973  [1930]) 
Ingarden argues the details of what sort of indeterminacies are bound to 
occur in the  schematic structure of the literary work as  realized in the 
reading  performance.  Significantly,  Ingarden's  distinctions  differ,  for 
example,  from  William  Empson's  'ambiguities'  in  that  they  are  not 
restricted to the level  of linguistics.  This has  implications  for  a broad 
intersemiotic  theory able  to  enrich  the verbal by  way  of nonlinguistic 
signification (see below). 
When Ingarden's work is mentioned it emerges as  the target of Iser's 
critique. Following Iser, Cornis-Pope speaks for example of 'Ingarden's 
confidence in the successful conclusion of the aesthetic process' (p. 46). 
This  is  a misconstrual.  Ingarden emphasizes  that the process  of filling 
the  lacunae  of indeterminacy  is  always  still  a  schematic  and never  a 
completed process. The reason for this misunderstanding is  that Cornis-
Pope reads  Ingarden via  Iser,  who  distances  himself from his  source, 
even  though  he  borrows  from  him  the  mainstays  of his  interpretive 
apparatus:  the schematic structure of literary language,  indeterminacy, 
concretization, and the distinction between the artistic and the aesthetic. 
Likewise the description of Ingarden's 'three-tiered structure (with the 
linguistic-thematic layer supporting a  level  of schematised  objects  and 
characters, which in turn generates a higher level of represented objects, 
a "world") [and which] helps the reader resolve the text into a "polyphony 
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of aesthetically valent qualities"' (p. 47) is a disastrous short-cut. What 
Ingarden is  on about is  to show how the reader's concretization results 
in  the  virtual constitution of the ontically heteronomous literary work. 
In performing the printed words, the reader cannot but bring into exis-
tence,  in a stratified epistemic sequence, the work from its material base 
via syntactic, semantic, imaginational, and higher-order semantic, includ-
ing  non  linguistic  acts.  There  is  no  argument  in  either  Wellek,  who 
wrongly speaks of norms, or Cornis-Pope that convinces the reader that 
Ingarden's  description  is  faulty  in  this  respect.  No  reading,  whether 
psychoanalytic, feminist  of any persuasion, or post-structuralist, would 
be  able  to talk about either the speech acts of a narrator or the phallo-
centric  and logocentric  vision  of a  signified  world  if it had not first 
performed logically prior operations and so  constituted the very 'objects' 
they debate. It is lngarden's remarkable contribution that starting from 
Husserlian principles,  such  as  noetic and noemic  acts,  appresentation, 
and the endowment of  meaning, he illustrated with the help of the literary 
how complex objects in the life-world are established by performance. 
A critique of Ingarden should get away from charging him with some-
thing he  has not done.  What could be attacked is  a number of gaps in 
his phenomenology: that it does not elaborate the ideological implications 
for  his higher-level constructions (although this could be rectified); that 
psychoanalysis has no place in his theory (although such a place can. be 
construed  without  fundamental  philosophical  shifts);  that  he  holds 
unnecessarily to a high art vs. low art distinction by granting only certain 
works  metaphysical qualities  (this seems  to fly  in  the face  of his  very 
own  descriptive  procedure  and can  be  amended);  that he  writes  in  a 
traditional  male  mode  (in  need  of revision);  that his  meanings  have 
lacunae but are otherwise stable (this is a moot point: indeterminacy vs. 
underdetermination); that he believes  in appropriate and inappropriate 
concretizations (there are no true concretizations, though wrong concreti-
zations  are possible);  appropriate are those which construe from given 
foundations and do not contradict textual information (which theoreti-
cally at least leaves infinite possibilities), in appropriate are constructions 
which  violate the material base (i.e.,  they are readings not of this text 
but of some other text; they are illegitimate not as behavior but as being 
regarded as readings of the materials in question); and that his distinction 
between the literary work and the literary work of art is established on 
evaluative criteria in terms of the quantity and degree of cohesion of the 
aesthetic  value  qualities  which  are  discoverable  (a trace  of traditional 
aesthetics  with its  built-in value  hierarchies  according to  principles  of 
harmony,  originality,  etc.)  But  even  without  this  last  distinction  the 86  H.  Ruthrof 
descriptive part of Ingarden's argument remains reasonably intact, still  t: 
waiting to be demolished by a strong countertheory.  b 
At one point Cornis-Pope repeats a widespread assumption about the  s 
phenomenological notion of concretization which is supposed to be 'pred-
icated  on  an  expressive  concept  of language,  on  a  faith  in  the  inner  l: 
plenitude of the "work as read"' (p. 51f.). This is right in the sense that  t 
language  is  conceived  in phenomenology as  the  dominant typification  s 
system among many others (other sign systems) and so is able to 'cover'  s 
an infinite number of possible phenomena. In the formulation by C.M. 
Meyers  (1958:  45)  an item of perception 'is apprehended incompletely  ' 
but is  n'Ot  apprehended as  incomplete'. This suggests an infinite regress 
of reading the world. 
Language as one of the schematic grids with which we do our reading, 
then, can never be exhausted - hence its alleged 'inner plenitude'. But 
I  suspect  that this  is  an empiricist misreading  of phenomenology.  We 
must note  that for  phenomenologists  meaning  is  not attached to  the 
sentence or given by it,  nor dictated by  'the world':  it is  'endowed by' 
the  user within  intersubjective  constraints.  There  is  always  something 
missing, never to be completed. Also, Cornis-Pope's reference to Husserl's 
'meaning precedes language' is  misunderstood (p. 52).  Meaning is  pre-
predicative in the sense that language is only one way of  carrying meaning, 
so that other forms of signification may precede the linguistic formulation, 
such  as  an image.  Where Husserl is  quite  wrong is  in  the  assumption 
that meaning is eidetic (Ruthrof 1992:  65-77). 
Intersemiotics 
There are a number of moments in the book when Cornis-Pope boldly 
envisages  'a deconstructive  critique'  that would  question  whether  'the 
language-centered model is still an adequate tool for the investigation of 
other  semiotic  systems  (visual,  cinematic,  psychological,  ideological)' 
(p. 164). And a little later he ends the section with the strong thesis that 
if  linguistics  is  still  regarded  as  the  explanatory  frame  for  an  all-
encompassing general semiotics the charge of logocentrism 'still has a lot 
of actuality'  (p. 176).  However short-lived these  speculations, they are 
important and have massive implications. If Cornis-Pope's hunch is right, 
and I think it is,  literary theory and criticism should invest in a broad 
intersemiotic theory, which would account for the partial commensurabil-
ity between signs and its interpretive negotiation, a theory of prelinguistic 
judgment, and above all a semantic more useful to literary readers than 
the theory of meaning prescribed to us all by analytical philosophy. The 1 
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task is huge and Cornis-Pope must be forgiven for not being able to 'go 
beyond' language, as his subsequent discussion of Barthes and Benveniste 
shows (p. 165). 
What is lacking in current literary theory is an account of the relation 
between linguistic signifiers and nonverbal semiosis. For surely, the imagi-
national freeplay  which is  triggered by narrative  sentences - 'explicit 
sexuality,  scopic  violence  ... '  (p. 30)  - is  not linguistic.  The  trigger 
stands  in a certain relation to the 'filling'  by visual,  proxemic,  kinetic, 
olfactory, thermal, gravitational, haptic, or aural significatory processes 
which  the linguistic helps  to set in train. If  we  are talking so  much of 
desire,  that which is  desired is  fantasied largely by  nonlinguistic signs, 
though never fulfilled.  For the nonverbal signs so  produced act in turn 
as triggers for further and further forms of signification. There seems to 
be no logical, but only pragmatic limits to this process. 
This kind of reasoning appears to be started but not carried through 
when  Cornis-Pope proposes  that 'meaning is  not located in the  given 
structures of the text, but in the unbounded interplay of various articula-
tions,  including  the  critic's  own  discourse'  (p. 85).  Is  discourse  only 
language in action or signification in general? Unfortunately, deconstruc-
tion  itself is  not particularly well  suited to pursue this question for the 
paradoxical reason of its  own 'logocentricity'. By  this I mean that the 
paradigm shift that is often imputed to have been introduced by Derrida 
as one from a logos-informed to a non-logocentric writing is  actually a 
shift  between  two  forms  of logocentricity:  one  propositional,  against 
which he has written at length, the other modal or, more precisely in his 
case, rhetorical. Both are versions of the linguistic turn away from what 
comes 'after' or 'before' language. 
Semiotically speaking, Derrida has hardly turned the corner, stuck as 
he  is  in the play pit of figural  speech.  To continue the non-logocentric 
project,  which can so  far only point to the limitations of the linguistic 
definiens  as  against its possible dejinienda,  amongst which language can 
be one, we require an intersemiotic theory. We need a theory capable of 
arguing  the  negotiation of the  relative incommensurability of different 
kinds of signification, including what is traditionally called 'perception'. 
Such a theory would distinguish Read Only Sign Systems (ROSS) from 
Communicative Signs  Systems (COSS) in order to cater for perception 
as a significatory activity (Ruthrof 1994). Without such a theory, speak-
ing of either speech acts or propositional contents, narrators or fictional 
world,  discours  or  histoire,  the  noetic  or the  noematic,  leads  to  two 
untenable results. One is to treat all these issues as language, and further 
language  chains,  as  does  most of linguistically  oriented criticism,  and 
deconstruction is no exception here; the other is to stipulate once again 88  H.  Ruthrof 
empirical objects ~  in other words, 'the world' as the given referent of 
both the deictic and the diegetic.  One way of getting out of this binary 
rut is  to reintroduce the lost 'world' by way of nonverbal signification: 
by way  of an intersemiotic  theory  of meaning.  This  can be  done  by 
combining a  Peircean  semiotics  with  a  modernized phenomenological 
theory of the constitution of objects  (Ruthrof 1992,  1993)  and recent 
writings in social semiotics (Hodge and Kress 1979). 
Throughout his  book Cornis-Pope speaks a  great deal of figuration 
but there  is  no  argument  as  to  how  precisely  any  such  figuration  i~ 
semiotically constituted before it is  once more undermined by critical 
production in rewriting. Is rewriting only the production of more linguis-
tic signifiers,  or does anything happen that make the signifiers  signify? 
And when they signify, do they signify more language? Also, is it possible 
to reread (i.e., produce critically) without any figuration whatsoever? This 
is  at the heart of the difference between pragmatic language use ('Open 
the window, please') and literary usage (focus on tropes). Literary explor-
ations of any sort of language surely require figurations of some sort, by 
which  one  could mean  the  activation  of potentially  all  nonlinguistic 
signification.  In that case, figurations would be replaced not simply by 
alternative tropes, but by a sequential dialectic between tropes and figu-
rations, whereby none could exist without the other. A consequence of 
this is  that we  can never escape figuration,  nor further text variations, 
and so henneneutics as a search for figurations cannot be discarded but 
only re-explained in terms of an infinite regress of interpretations. 
Following  de  Man,  Cornis-Pope  notes  that  'language  can  refer  to 
experience only by means of signs that replace a phenomenal object with 
a rhetorical figure that does not share any of the sensory determinations 
of its referent (the word 'flower' does not bloom or emit perfume like a 
natural flower)'  (p. 96).  One is  inclined to add that this  applies  to  all 
signs, even those, like iconic signs, which appear to share certain charac-
teristics with objects of perception. Furthermore, what a rhetorical figure 
is to language are the endless modalities of the visual, olfactory, kinetic, 
haptic, or proxemic to nonlinguistic signs. What remains unexplained in 
the passage is how 'a rhetorical figure' amounts to meaning. Meaning, I 
suggest, does not reside in language. Again, an intersemiotic explanation 
is warranted: meaning occurs as  an interpretive event in which at least 
two, and usually more than two, sign systems are aligned. I have elsewhere 
named this description the 'semiotic corroboration thesis' (Ruthrof 1992: 
102-119). 
From this perspective one must take issue with de Man's failure to see 
the  significatory  nature  of nonlinguistic  experience.  In  a  paraphrase 
by Norris,  de  Man attacks  the false  assumption "'that language is  a 
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natural,  organic phenomenon; that linguistic structures are there to be 
perceived,  like  objects  in  the  natural  world;  and  that  the  process  of 
interpreting texts is  best understood in terms deriving from the activity 
of sensuous cognition"' (Cornis-Pope, p. 97;  quoted from Norris 1988: 
37).  But Cornis-Pope compounds the misconception in de  Man's and 
Norris's accounts further when he writes that 'poetic language can pro-
duce  this  effect  only by obfuscating its  own  articulatory processes,  by 
concealing the differences between natural and artificial, human and non-
human,  present and absent, literal and figural'  (p. 97). What has gone 
wrong? We are dealing here with an error that is a consequence of a pop 
version of the linguistic turn. Of course de  Man and his  commentators 
are  right in emphasizing the artificial nature of language. My objection 
has  to do with what appears to be its  'natural' counterpart, perceptual 
cognition. 
In de Man this error takes the form of a claim that language constructs 
are significatory, while nonlinguistic cognitive information processing is 
not. This is a return to a pre-Kantian empiricist position, a move all the 
more surprising since I know from my own conversations with de Man 
that he would not have wished to be accused of anything as vile as that. 
The  problem  lies  in  the  significatory  monopoly  of language  and the 
relegation  of perception to  some  natural sensory process.  Instead,  we 
need a more Peircean approach. All schematization of reality is significa-
tory. The point is that all signs, cognitive and communicative alike, have 
to  be  read and that all  such  reading  procedures  have  to  be  learned. 
Without interpretive attention we  could derive no meaning from any of 
them,  notwithstanding habitual conceptualization. And what has to be 
read is  by definition significatory. 
If this  is  so,  the  task  is  to  show  how  linguistic  and  nonlinguistic 
signification interact in spite of  the demonstrable, relative incommensura-
bility  between  not just verbal  and  nonverbal  signs,  but also  amongst 
nonverbal  signification systems.  Certainly, without nonverbal significa-
tion we  could not make sense of sentences at all.  This is to say that we 
cannot simply 'read' if this means to stay within one and the same sign 
system. The linguistic requires activation via nonlinguistic signs. At most, 
de  Man's  recipe  can  achieve  an  emphasis  of the  self-referentiality  of 
language,  but only  once the language schematization of our world has 
been activated by nonlinguistic signification. 'Close bosom-friend of the 
maturing sun' remains mute even at the plane of  rhetorical figures without 
its activation by the nonverbal (visual, kinetic, proxemic, thermal, gravita-
tional, aural, olfactory, tactile, haptic signs)- in short, without turning 
what is syntactic into a semantic. But remember that there is no semantic 
which  is  merely  syntactic,  except  in  formal  languages.  We  require  an 90  H.  Ruthrof 
intersemiotic  ascent  by  going  outside  the  linguistic  system  to  general 
semiosis, into which all language gears. This is  the sort of intersemiotic 
argument literary theory, including its deconstructive versions, needs to 
recover from its logocentricity. 
So  Cornis-Pope is  right in  granting Peirce  an important place in  his 
discussion (pp. 179f.). One would want more Peirce, however, bearing in 
mind  the initial promise  of a  sociocultural  approach.  Peirce  has  very 
important things  to  say  for  such  a  project.  Perhaps  one  of the  most 
important of these  is  his  notion of the centrality of inference  (p. 179). 
The term is mentioned by Cornis-Pope but not pursued. And yet it has 
weighty theoretical consequences, not the least of which is a post-Kantian 
move:  if we  cannot help but realize the world in terms of signification 
whatever  we  know  about  the  world  beyond  our  signs  is  by  way  of 
inference.  And this  includes  the  constraints  on  our significations  that 
govern what we can experience. This sort of insight supplies a sophisti-
cated  frame,  neither  metaphysically  realist  nor  radically  'relativist' 
textualist, within which we can place a sociocultural reading practice. 
Telos 
Fairly early in his book Cornis-Pope defends his self-reflexive task against 
Stanley  Fish's  claim  that  critical  self-awareness  is  'epistemologically 
impossible'. According to Fish (1980:  276f.),  '"in every situation some 
or  other meaning  will  appear  to us  to  be  uninterpreted because  it  is 
isomorphic with  the  interpretive  structure the  situation (and therefore 
our perception)  already has" '.  In his  criticism  of the  passage  Cornis-
Pope somewhat overshoots the target.  'This anti-theoretical stance', he 
feels,  'rules  out not only critical  self-examination,  but also  any viable 
form of critical pluralism based on a knowledge  of the available inter-
pretive alternatives and their epistemological consequences' (p. 18). But 
Fish says that certain meanings always 'appear to us to be uninterpreted'; 
they  seem  natural,  given  the  frame  within  which  both  observer  and 
observed item function.  This  in no way  undermines  the  possibility of 
'critical pluralism'.  On the  contrary,  it  liberates  interpreters from  pre-
ordained semantic obligations and gives their will to interpretation a free 
reign - almost,  that is.  For whatever interpretive direction we  choose, 
plural or monological, there are always consequences. Interpretive ran-
domness is  a difficult heuristic principle to sustain, if it is possible at all. 
The reason for this is that we cannot fully escape the hermeneutic telos, 
in Kant's speculative  sense.  We  cannot eradicate the  teleological  from 
the text, and if we could, we would no longer have a text, as  a sequence 
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of signs. What has happened is not so  much the removal of telos as its 
shift from the interpreted text to the tools of interpretation. 
This appears to be the position Cornis-Pope supports when he notes 
the  gradual replacement of 'the linear, referential teleology of a classic 
text'  by  'a deconstructive teleology' (p. 93).  In this light his critique of 
Fish's anarchic plurality is well taken. 'In the absence of any theoretical 
evaluation of the  critical beliefs  and strategies brought to  bear on the 
texi, .we  are left with a proliferation of local narratives that turn out to 
be  even  more constraining, more enslaved to their sets  of unexamined 
norms'  (p. 19). If we  cannot escape  the use  of interpretive frames  we 
sl;l.ould  at least be aware of their competing teleologies. 
What has not happened, however, in the shift of emphasis from textual 
to  interpretive  telos  is  that the much-maligned hermeneutic desire has 
been replaced by non-libidinal strategies, as Cornis-Pope seems to assume 
when he writes, 'other projects of reading (deconstructive, feminist, soci-
ocritical) have proposed stronger strategies for disrupting the pleasure-
producing coherences of narration, and rewriting its cultural system of 
references'  (p. 32).  This  is  not where  the desire-pleasure story ends.  I 
suggest that with the transfer of telos the pleasure-producing mechanisms 
have  likewise slipped into the metanarration, the narration which gives 
cohesion to the disruptive process. What would feminist criticism do if 
the telos of the deconstruction of phallocentricity were abandoned? Thus 
is  revealed  a  second-order hermeneutics whose  telos  is  in no way  less 
powerful than its first-order cousin. The hermeneutic search is now aimed 
at  discovering not the hidden telos of the narrative itself,  but the  telos 
which  optimizes the reader's critical strategy. Far from being absent in 
critical  forms  of rewriting,  hermeneutics has 'merely' exchanged levels. 
One  could  say  hermeneutics  has  caught  up  with  Godel's  critique  of 
Principia Mathematica and other formal systems by realizing that certain 
secrets  cannot be resolved  at the level  of the primary text,  but need a 
metalevel as well as the infinite regress of further and further systems to 
travel the trajectories of the undecidables of interpretation. Yet without 
telos,  no narrative at all . 
'Why  is  Hawthorne's  Georgiana  willing  to  submit  to  the  knife?' 
(p. 278). What else but hermeneutic desire would ask such a question? 
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